Official report

OLD TOPANGA INCIDENT

County of Los Angeles Fire Department
November 2, 1993 to November 11, 1993

MALIBU'S HISTORY

That breathtaking landscape where delicately carved canyons merge with the vast horizon of the Pacific Ocean has been a choice location for human habitation for thousands of years. Ancient Chumash Native Americans as well as modem man have enjoyed this place where warm winds flow from the mountains, through the canyons to this place known as The Malibu.

Malibu is a place with an almost magical appeal. The geography is magnificent with abundant vegetation due to the moist coastal flow. Homes are built to accentuate the surrounding of nature, and man's interface with his natural surroundings is displayed to an almost picture perfect "T" - Almost.

Although gentle in appeal at first glance, Malibu has plagued it's inhabitants with disasters time and time again. Summer becomes Fall, the moist coastal flow turns it's deceptive back and the wind transforms into the Devil himself. These "Devil Winds" or "Santa Ana's" begin to flow, bringing hot dry desert air from the north and northeast. The winds quickly extract remaining moisture from the lush chaparral and that picture perfect scenery now becomes a canvas for disaster.

FIRE HISTORY OF THE MALIBU AREA

The disaster chronicles of Malibu are littered with wild land and urban interface fires that have started with a spark and been augmented by these very conditions. These fires have burned with enormous intensity and traveled at will with alarming speeds to their natural point of extinguishment, the Pacific Ocean.

The unique interplay of topography, fuel load, and wind has made the Santa Monica Mountains home to some of the most spectacular and horrific fires in the history of our nation. The Hume Fire of 1956, the Wright Fire of 1970, and the Piuma Fire of 1985 are the past names of the same "beast" that appeared on November 2, 1993. There have been literally hundreds of fires in the Santa Monica's throughout history, and many share similar routes to the ocean, through the same canyon corridors of the Santa Monica Mountains. Residents and fire fighters who experienced the Hume, the Wright, or the Piuma Fire claim that the speed and fury with which the Topanga Fire blew to the coast is unparalleled.

FIRE CORRIDORS

Spanning fifty-two miles from east to west, the Santa Monica Mountains are the only mountain range that bisects a major American city. Physically, the mountains are an uplifted, folded land form which rose up from the ocean during the past eight million years. Ten miles at its widest point, and reaching an elevation of 3,111 feet at its western end, the mountains have the rugged profile of a geologically young range, cut deeply by water erosion. The frontal ridge line of the Santa Monica's parallels the coast from two to five miles inland, and is broken by 2,000 foot plunges in Malibu and Topanga Creeks. This erosive cutting into the ridge has formed spectacular gorges, fourteen to eighteen hundred feet deep running from north to south. Other drain ages, although not as spectacular, form many sheer transverse canyons and arroyos of the Malibu area. By virtue of the year round water flow in these drainages, as well as the Mediterranean climate, vegetation thrives in these canyons.

Beginning in 1925, when the County of Los Angeles Forester and Fire Warden first began charting the history of fires in these mountains, a strong correlation between point of origin and path of fire spread to the coast has been documented in "Santa Ana" driven fires. Many times the fire would travel an identical route through the canyons under non-identical wind conditions. Experienced early day Fire Officers would amass resources at certain inland points in an effort to stop the fire before it hit these "corridors." Las Virgenes, Lost Hills, Liberty, Kan an, Triunfo, and Topanga are the legendary names of these battlegrounds. Prior to the 1960's, the majority of these canyons were filled with thick brush and wildlife. As the greater Los Angeles area has expanded northward, the area has grown to include thousands of homes, a major university, and portions of six different cities. The City of Malibu lies entirely within the coastal aspect of this range.

FUEL

The Santa Monica Mountains foster life for nine different plant communities. From offshore kelp beds, the upward sweep of the mountain range becomes a home to coastal sage scrub on the mesas and arroyos, to elevated Grasslands, and to the Riparian and Oak Woodlands of Malibu and Topanga Creeks. From a fire perspective, the most notable among these plant communities is the unique collection of plants known as the Chaparral.

The name Chaparral was given to these plants by the Vaqueros, who realized similarities with the "Chapparo" shrub stands in Spain. In only four areas of the world have similar types of plant communities evolved to withstand low annual rainfall and high summer temperatures. This association of plants have completed this evolution of internally conserving water by various means.

In Southern California, the Chaparral exists as both "hard" and "soff ' species. Soft Chaparral is comprised primarily of the Sage varieties (White, Black, and Purple), California Buckwheat, Yucca, and Prickly Pear. Hard Chaparral species such as Laurel Sumac, Chemise, Scrub Oak, Ceanothus, and Mountain Lilac, have adapted to the harsh conditions by developing stiff, oily leaves and long root systems. In periods of drought, the plants satisfy their need for energy by continuing to leaf out from the bulk of the plant. Over long periods, these plants become essentially a shell of live growth surrounding a frame of deadwood. This dead undergrowth can exceed 80% of the weight of a thirty year old plant. Dense stands of these hard brush communities eventually become impenetrable to humans. Chaparral, whether hard or soft, provides watershedprotectionwhichreducesflooding. This has become especially important with the advent of housing developments in the region over the past 100 years. The reverse side to this watershed protection is that these plants have evolved to live with wildfire. As estimated by the County of Los Angeles Fire Department Forestry Division, the dead undergrowth of the Chaparral depends on fire every 20 to 30 years for renewal.

One of the responsibilities of the Forestry Division is to monitor live fuel moisture. By calculating the percentage of live to dead fuel, an estimation can be drawn on the Chaparral's readiness for fire. In Los Angeles County, these measurements are taken year round from specific fuels on a monthly basis. The resulting information is then charted and distributed to County of Los Angeles Fire Stations and Camps for fire behavior analysis. These live fuel moisture counts give fire fighters a strong indication of what kind of fire behavior to expect. Moisture content in the Chaparral is cyclical, and can reach counts 200% in the spring. On October 21, 1993, with fuel moisture in the Malibu area approaching the 60% range, all Fire Department Administrative Sites warned to expect extreme fire behavior.

WEATHER

On November 1, 1993, as it has done for eons, a high pressure zone was centered over Nevada, Northern Arizona and Utah. Concuffently, the Southern California coast a low pressure zone migrated into the area. This differential in pressure created a gradient, and hot desert air began to flow toward the ocean. Typically, these winds begin from a northerly direction. As the winds pushed toward the ocean, gravity directed the flow into the transverse canyons and of the Santa Monica's. Wind speed increased and relative hun-Lidity dropped. The Foehn winds had arrived, the winds the Spaniards called the "SantaAna's." A Red Flag Warning had been issued for November 2, 1993. The weather forecasted temperatures in the mid 80's, winds 20 to 40 miles per hour with local gusts to 60 miles per hour, and arelative humidity of 7 to 13 percent. By noon on November 1st, County of Los Fire Department Captains in the Antelope and Santa Clarita Valleys began to report Santa Ana conditions of sustained north-northwesterly winds at thirty miles an hour, with rapidly dropping humidity. A short time later, the Department's Operations Bureau began a full mobilization. By 2000 hours on the I st, all County of Los Angeles Fire Department engines assigned to brush battalions were fully staffed, extra patrol pumpers and water tenders were placed in service, and drivers were assigned to all Chief Officers. It was the first of many days of extended duty for County Fire fighters.

SPECIFIC FIRE BEHAVIOR

The fire of November 2, 1993, like it's flaming predecessors, began as a spark to the north east of Malibu. The call from a resident was received at 1046 hours via 91 1 stating that a fire had been sighted near the water tower on Old Topanga Canyon Road. A First Alarm Brush response was dispatched at 1049 hours to the fire in Engine 69's jurisdiction. Engine 75 made the first visual report stating that smoke was visible from one half mile out.

Within the first half hour of the Old Topanga Fire, the Incident Commander predicted that the fire would "go to the beach," as it had in 1956, 1970, and 1985. In a classic Santa Ana condition, the high pressure zone will migrate southward through Arizona. As it continues to migrate, and gradient flow to the coast continues, the wind vector will change. Soon the northerly wind will become a north easterly, and then an easterly. When the high pressure zone migrates far enough south, the pressure gradient is lost, and with it, the winds die. The rapidity with which the Old Topanga fire spread introduced another variable for the Incident Commander's consideration. The winds at the time of the fire's inception were almost dormant as witnessed by initial responders. However, as the huge convection column began spiraling some six miles into the sky, spawned from nearly 1,000 acres of burning wild land just one hour into the fire, the massive column created an enormous vacuum. Winds that were beginning to change to easterly were deflected by the upward rush of super-heated air. Flame lengths of 200 feet were observed as the fire crested Saddle Peak, and 100 foot flame lengths were reported in many stands of old vegetation above Pacific Coast Highway. Storms of embers and flaming brands caused observed spotting one half mile in advance of the fire, with spotting distances being calculated to distances of up to 2.6 miles.

At approximately 1200 hours, on November 2, as flames spilled due south and slightly westward toward Malibu. Concurrent with this request, changing wind vectors forced fire into the mouths of all the major coastal canyons in the Malibu area. Strike Teams were amassing on Pacific Coast Highway, in preparation for what nearly all involved would describe as the "fight of their lives."

What the Malibu area lacks in fire frequency it makes up for in uniqueness. As the fire raced across the coastal mesas, experienced fire fighters noticed the wind change. Abruptly it slowed from a twenty mile per hour northerly, and then stopped. After an eerie quiet noted by some as lasting one to two minutes, it suddenly picked up from the opposite direction. This set up a "Roll Eddy" current which ripped wind and oxygen up from the ocean, and pulled the fire over the ridge line with an unbelievable new power. In succession, the fire exploded through Carbon Canyon, Rambla Pacifico, Las Flores Canyon, Piedra Gorda, and Pena and Tuna Canyons. In these canyons, five separate fire engines were overrun completely destroying two and sending six fire fighters to the hospital.

Fed by the immense unimpeded oxygen supply from the Pacific, the fire screamed down upon the mesas and arroyos. Roll Eddies lifted embers hundreds of feet into the air and Santa Ana's imbedded them into every structure. Ironically, ornamental vegetation such as Junipers and Cypress, planted by homeowners to be drought resistant, became a harbor for hidden fires. Some homes that were saved from the approaching fires were lost later as fire spread from these plants to the homes. All told the fire would claim the lives of three citizens and injure twenty one others. 565 fire fighters would receive injuries resulting from the operation, 16,516 acres of water shed would be charred and 388 structures along with countless items of personal belonging would be destroyed.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

On November 1, 1993, the day before the "Old Topanga Incident" erupted, the County of Los Angeles Fire Department prepared and placed into force a contingency plan. The plan was formulated and implemented due to predicted weather conditions and referenced with regard to knowledge gained from past incidents. Developed in order to bring the County of Los Angeles Fire Department to a state of full readiness, and in anticipation of a possible dangerous brush fire condition, the plan went into effect twelve hours in advance of the Incident. This forethought undoubtedly played a significant role by contingently enhancing fire fighting and command resources. It should be noted that the Department had absolutely no prior knowledge as to where or when a fire might erupt and prepared the plan to protect all brush intensive areas of the County of Los Angeles. Above is a copy of the Departmental procedures that went into effect at 2000 hours on November 1, 1993.

So began the 911 call that set into motion the largest mobilization of emergency resources in the history of the State of California. Within minutes units were en route to the fire and a system to coordinate the attack was being implemented.

The system had to provide a standard approach that would be understood by the 458 different agencies eventually called to battle the fire. It would need to foster systematic management for 1,000 plus fire companies staffed by over 7,000 fire fighters as well as countless personnel drawn to support the overall effort. The system had to be flexible to adapt for changing conditions and incident growth, as well as provide common communications to ensure continuity of command. The system, utilizing lessons from history, had already been developed, and is known as the Incident Command System.

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

The Incident Command System was developed through a cooperative inter-agency (Local, State and Federal) effort. The basic organizational structure of the Incident Command System is based upon a large fire organization which has been developed over time by federal fire protection agencies. The essential differences are that the Incident Command System is designed to be used for all kinds of emergencies, and is applicable to both small day to day situations as well as very large and complex incidents.

INCIDENT COMMANDERS

The Incident Commander is responsible for incident activities including the development and implementation of strategic decisions and for approving the ordering and releasing of resources.

The "Old Topanga Incidenf'spanned ten days, and during that time six County of Los Angeles Fire Department chief officers served as Incident Commander. Their overall objectives were to protect and ensure safety for the involved citizenry, to protect and preserve property values within the incident area, to provide safety for fire fighting and support personnel involved in the incident effort, and to contain and control the fire.

COMMAND STAFF

The Incident Commanders were supported by the Command Staff. The Command Staff is comprised of personnel manning three positions, reporting directly to the Incident Commander in support of the overall incident plan.

The positions are:

The Information Officer who is responsible for the formulation and release of information about the incident to the news media and other appropriate agencies and organizations.
The Safety Officer who is responsible for monitoring and assessing hazardous and unsafe situations and developing measures for assuring personnel safety. The Safety Officer is charged with correcting unsafe acts or conditions through the regular line of authority, although the Officer may exercise emergency authority, to stop or prevent unsafe acts when immediate action is required. The Safety Officer must maintain awareness of active and developing situations and approves the Medical Plan as well as including safety messages in each Incident Action Plan. The Liaison Officer who is the point of contact for the assisting and cooperating Agency Representatives. This includes Agency Representatives from other fire agencies, Red Cross, law enforcement, public works and engineering organizations etc.

OPERATIONS SECTION

The Operations Section is the tactical portion of the Incident Command System which manages the execution of all operations directly applicable to the primary mission and incident objectives. The Section is managed by the Operations Section Chief who reports directly to the Incident Commander and orchestrates all functionary assignments of the Branches, Divisions, and Groups under his command.

STAGING

Staging is that function of the Operations Section that provides the ability to temporarily locate resources, which are allocated to an incident and immediately available for assignment. Staging Areas are geographic locations under the Operations Section Chief and are generally located within the incident area. Staging area activities are conducted by Staging Area Managers who report directly to the Operations Section Chief.

Three staging areas were established during the "Old Topanga Incident" due to the large and varied geographic area that needed to be accessed by emergency units. Strategic identification of staging area locations was accomplished with thorough consideration being placed on tactical resource deployment. The three staging areas were arranged to form a triangle of emergency access around the predicted involvement area. The strategic thought process was as follows: Resources staged in the three locations wouldreliably provide response points from two of the three staging areas to any assignment location on the Incident. By providing two access points a fail-safe was established in the event of response route closures due to incident conditions. Additionally, Branch Directors had the ability to acquire resources for rapid response during times of difficult communications.

The staging area along the north flank of the fire was located at County of Los Angeles Fire Station 125 on Las Virgenes Road near Highway 101. This location was chosen with regard to it's proximity to a major freeway artery that would be utilized by resources as they entered the Incident area from the north and south. This location also provided easy access to the Malibu area via Las Virgenes Road.

The second staging area that was established was designed to control and direct resources as they arrived from the south along Pacific Coast Highway and was designated "Coast Staging." The location of Coast Staging was the intersection of Pacific Coast Highway and Topanga Canyon Boulevard. A check in point was established at this location for units arriving from the south that were anticipated for use along the coast and in the canyons most easily accessible from the coastal flank of the fire.

The third staging area established was known as "Civic Staging" and was located on Civic Center Drive within the City of Malibu. This staging area was proximal to the head of the fire, as it moved into Malibu, and was easily accessed by units as they arrived from the north and west.

The Old Topanga Incident required the largest mobilization of emergency resources, within a twenty four hour period, in the history of California and perhaps the world. As stands to reason, this tremendous influx of resources placed an enormous burden on staging personnel with regard to establishing check-in procedures, traffic control, and filling resource assignment requests. The general functions of the staging areas were as follows:

As resources were allocated to the incident, via the Region I Emergency Coordination Center, they were instructed to report to one of the three staging areas. The County of Los Angeles Fire Department coordinates and staffs the Region 1 Emergency Coordination Center for the State of California. Upon arrival at Staging they checked in with the Check-in Recorders and were directed by the Staging Managers to a parking location. As resources were requested by the Operations Section Chief, the Staging Manager notified and dispatched them to their requested assignment.

The Operations Section of the "Old Topanga Incident" was charged with protecting the lives of thousands of citizens and greater than 22,000 structures in the midst of a fire that would consume 16,516 acres. 3,634 structures were directly exposed to the fire with an additional 18,870 threatened if the spread had not been contained. At the point of full development the Operations Section encompassed 5 geographic branches, and an Air Operations Branch. The 5 geographic branches were designated "I", "II", "III", "IV", "V" and were in turn supported by 16 divisions fortified with the following resources:

BRANCH OPERATIONS
The incident operations within each Branch were controlled by the Branch Directors who reported directly to the Operations Section Chief. The Branch Director assigned resources as needed to the Divisions within the Branch and in turn these resources operated under the direct guidance of the Division Supervisors. Strike Team Leaders directed the activities of each strike team with company operations being directed by company supervisors to effect the overall goal of the mission.

AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH
The aerial delivery of water and retardants, to strategic targets during the "Old Topanga Incident," was an absolute necessity to confine and contain the fire. The Air Operations Branch provided rotary as well as fixed wing aircraft to facilitate the accomplishment of this challenging goal. Aircraft were deployed from the County of Los Angeles Fire Department, the United States Forest Service, the California Department of Forestry, the United States Air National Guard, and the Los Angeles City Fire Department. The functional groups within the Air Operations Branch are the Air Support Group and the Air Attack Group.

AIR SUPPORT GROUP
The Air Support Group is that functional aspect of the Air Operations Branch that provides for the maintenance, fueling, and water/retardant loading of the aircraft. The locations established within this group are Helibases, Helispots and Fixed Wing Bases. Helispots utilized during the Old Topanga Incident were 69-A and 88-A, as well as helispots established by Los Angeles City Fire Department Air Operations personnel. Helispot 88-A was designated "Pepper Base", due to it's location on the Pepperdine University campus. This helispot served as a dual function helibase/helispot by supporting the operation with fuel loading and maintenance in addition to water loading. Camp 8 was also utilized as an alternate helibase. Fixed wing operations flew sorties from Point Mugu Naval Air Station and William J. Fox Airport in Lancaster, California.

AIR ATTACK GROUP
The Air Attack Group is responsible for those functional aspects of fire fighting that deal directly with the aerial delivery of water and retardants to targets set forth by the Operations Section. This group serves to augment the overall fire fighting and exposure protection objective. Aircraft may also be summoned to provide aerial reconnaissance and emergency medical transportation if deemed necessary during the course of the incident.

The Air Attack Group during the Old Topanga Incident provided incident support through the utilization of rotary and fixed wing delivery of water and retardants as well as reconnaissance information reported by observers in both types of aircraft. This function of reconnaissance proved to be a valuable tool, throughout the course of the incident, due to steep inaccessible terrain and the vast area involved by the fire.

The Air Operations Branch was managed by the Air Operations Branch Director supplied by the Bureau of Land Management. An Air Attack Supervisor from the United States Forest Service was assigned and supervised all rotary and fixed wing operations in support of the mission. Rotary wing aircraft provided by the County of Los Angeles Fire Department were coordinatedby Senior Pilots flying on line and conducting operations set forth by the Air Attack Supervisor. 132.1 hours of flight time were logged by 7 County of Los Angeles Fire Department pilots, flying 7 helicopters and operating from 2 helispots. 797 water drops delivered 286,920 gallons of water and foam, to various targets within the incident area. Los Angeles City Fire Department assisted the effort with 5 helicopters and 12 pilots. Los Angeles City Fire Department pilots logged 153.5 hours of flight time and dropped 164,150 gallons. Eleven Vertol and Sky Crane helicopters, ordered through the Emergency Coordination Center (E.C.C.) and provided via Operational Coordination Center (O.C.C.), assisted in the operation by delivering water drops from their 2,000 and 3,000 gallon water buckets.

Fixed wing aircraft provided through the United States Forest Service, the California Department of Forestry and the Military delivered 1,047,950 gallons of fire retardant to targets in support of the Incident Action Plan. 31 aircraft flew a total of 186 sorties for a total of 123.1 hours of flight time.

Tuesday, November 2, 1993, 1045 hours to 1800 hours

At approximately 0800 hours on November 2, 1993, at the request of the Ventura County Fire Department, the County of Los Angeles Fire Department dispatched two strike teams and a helicopter to the "Green Meadow Incident." This previously contained fire had revived its vigor as a result of increasing winds. The "Green Meadow Incident" was located northwest of the City of Malibu near Leo Carillo State Beach. There was great concern that this now small fire could suddenly gather momentum and sweep south-east toward Los Angeles County.

As the threat of the Green Meadow fire subsided at around 1030 hours, strike teams from the County of Los Angeles Fire Department were released.

THE INITIAL RESPONDERS

At lO:49, Engines 69, 68, 75, 125, 70, 5144 and 5125 (many just returning from the Green Meadow fire) were dispatched to the Incident. Patrols 69, 269 and 75, Crews 15-1, 15-2 and 16-3, Air Squad 9, Copter 15 with Crew 2-1, Superintendents 9 and 17, Dozer with Construction I 1, and Battalion 18 in place of Battalion 5 (assigned to the Green Meadow Fire) were also dispatched.

With Santa Ana winds gusting to 40 miles per hour, flames began rolling downhill from the water tanks toward Old Topanga Canyon Road. As Engine 75 began the arduous climb up the winding narrow road from Station 68's district they had their first glimpse of a budding smoke column. At 10:55 Engine 75 reported, "L.A., smoke showing from one half mile out."

Just after Engine 75's report, Patrol 69 arrived on scene and gave the size-up report on the most disastrous fire in this Department's history, "L.A., Patrol 69, we have one acre running uphill, start a second alarm." Just behind Patrol 69, was Patrol 269 - both patrols began attacking the fire in medium fuel on the north side of Old Topanga Canyon Road. In the meantime, Engine 75 had arrived at the north end of the now one acre fire and joined the attack with the two patrols. At 10:59 Engine 69 arrived on scene to find 30 mile per hour plus winds fanning three to four spot fires on the south side of Old Topanga Canyon Road. The fire continued a downhill run into dense stands of fuel that had not burned since 1926.

As the crew of Engine 69 attempted a downhill attack on the southern flank, flames were being whipped into a frenzy as 30 to 40 foot flame lengths towered over the firefighters from Topanga. The fire seemed to be growing in a logarithmic fashion. Surveying the rapidly deteriorating situation, Patrol 69 gave a chilling report to the Fire Command and Control Facility, "L.A., Patrol 69, start strike teams, this fire is headed to the coast."

The fire had spread from I acre to 200 acres in less than I 0 minutes, and the largest deployment in the history of California for a single fire had begun.

Battalion Chief 18 responded from his assignment in Battalion 6. While en route to the fire he could see the distant smoke from the Green Meadow fire but didn't notice any significant smoke columns in the Malibu area, due to the strong winds forcing the smoke to blow low into the canyons. As he arrived into the Topanga area however, he caught his first glimpse of what the heavy radio traffic had been indicating. The magnitude of the situation became readily apparent. He immediately declared himself as the Incident Commander and established the initial Command Post at a location known as "The Top of Old Topanga."

On the west flank and advancing front, the fire was now spotting far ahead of itself along Saddle Peak Road placing several homes near Stunt Road in immediate danger. On the east flank the fire was working its way down Old Topanga Canyon Road toward the residences in Topanga Canyon. The fire was spreading rapidly, and with reinforcements still en route, evacuation of the immediately threatened citizenry became of paramount importance! All available fire suppression and law enforcement units were ordered to effect immediate evacuations.

As the Incident Commander began deploying resources into Topanga Canyon it became quickly apparent that any type of fire fighting operations would face severe challenges. The evacuation of citizens not only tied up fire department resources, but congested the roadways as well - making access throughthecanyonsdifficult. Strongwindscreated erratic fire behavior, and dense foliage around structures and over roads denied engine companies the necessary defensible space from which to operate effectively.

Thick smoke produced limited visibility and hampered effective helicopter operations in the narrow canyons. Water pressure was poor and would get worse as the day went on, as were radio communications also affected by the steep canyon walls.

With emergency radio traffic rising to a feverish pitch the worst was realized by the initial responders. The engineer from Engine 69 encountered a severely burned man struggling toward him up a long driveway. Before the crew could reach the man, two men in a pick-up truck placed him in the back and drove him to Engine 69's location. The burned man told the crew that his friend was trapped in the house at the end of the driveway.

The quarter of a mile driveway was completely engulfed in flames and 69's crew was forced to watch and wait until the tunnel of fire lessened. When the flames had subsided they began a search. The second victim with second and third degree bums over ninety percent of his body was found wading in a swimming pool.

Engine 69, along with Squad 88, initiated emergency medical procedures in the back of the pick-up truck and called for the immediate airlift of the victims. Hampered by heavy radio traffic and limited visibility the exact rescue location was difficult to find from the air, but as a result of persistent efforts by the flight crews of Air Squad 9 and Air Squad 17 the victims were quickly airlifted to Sherman Oaks Burn Center.

INITIAL INCIDENT ACTION PLAN

As Department Chief Officers responded to the incident, cellular phones were utilized to begin strategic deployment. The major concerns identified during these en-route conversations were:

The need to place resources ahead of the fire.
The need to establish an anchor pointon the fire.
The need to begin development ofcontrol lines.
The need to begin immediate resource augmentation.
The need to quickly provide overhead personnel to compensate for anticipated command requirements and communications difficulties. The need too ensure citizen safety.

These concerns were addressed, while en-route via cellular phone and radio communications, with the following actions:

10 engine strike teams were ordered and dispatched. Three engine strike teams were responded to the origin area of the fire, to hold the fire and provide structure protection, and seven engine strike teams were ordered to the coast. Level / response with chief officers and overhead to compensate for anticipated communications problems. Fixed wing and helicopter air support were ordered. 10 crew strike teams were ordered.

As Department Chief Officers arrived at Fire Station 70 and General Staff positions were assigned, the following incident concerns were identified: The fuel load was vety heavy and extreme flame lengths could be expected. Communications would be difficult if not impossible. This included both telephone and cellular phones.
Municipal water loss should be anticipated in the canyons. 35 additional engine strike teams (1 75 engines) were ordered and the Emergency Coordination Center was placed on line.

Sheriff's Department was brought on line to begin permissive evacuations. Evacuations would create tremendous traffic concerns for emergency vehicles if not directed.

Fire fighter safety was going to be difficult to ensure.

Structure protection would be difficult and hazardous due to limited access, narrow canyon roads and vegetative canopy.

The "Green Meadow" fire in Ventura County was expanding and might become a factor on the western flank of the incident.

Incident duration would be lengthy.

Animal control would be a problem.

With these concems in mind the Incident Commander took the following actions: The Incident Command System was fully established to organize and address all areas of the incident as they materialized.

Fire history maps and fire behavior were evaluatedand-potentialfire corridors were identified. At this point Monte Nido, Serra Retreat and Femwood Pacific were identified as areas likely to be first in harms way. Resources were ordered and assigned as they arrived to protect these areas. Evacuations were coordinated with the Sheriffs Department with special emphasis being placed on directing evacuees toward the north. This was done in an attempt to keep Pacific Coast Highway open for emergency equipment. It should be noted that the County of Los Angeles Sheriff's Department did an exemplary job in the accomplishment of this enormous task.

A traffic plan was coordinated with the Califomla Highway Patrol to keep maln emergency access routes open. It was imperative to maintain emergency right of way along Pacific Coast Highway and an outstanding effort by the California Highway Patrol accomplished this task. Extra overhead personnel were ordered realizing that face to face communication would become a necessity to effect Incident operations and provide a margin for fire fighter safety. Overhead was also assigned to monitor "Green Meadow."

A direct line of communication was established via telephone between the Incident Command Post at Fire Station 70 and the Fire Command and Control facility. This line remained open until the Command Post location was moved to Pepperdine University. Fixed wing aircraft were assigned to the western flank when visibility and fire related turbulence permitted operation.

Dozers were ordered to begin development of a control line along the eastern and western flanks of the fire. Dozer operations during this period were extremely difflcult with regard to terrain and fire conditions. The operations were accomplished due only to the courageous exhibition of service by their operators and crews.

Helicopters and Engines were assigned in front of the fire for structure protection. Hand crews were ordered to work in a flanking action toward Femwood Pacific in conjunction with the dozer operation.

Reports from crew strike team leaders indicated that the flanking fire control lines were effective as they followed the fire which was now producing 100 foot plus flame lengths. Requests for additional resources by the Incident Commander now totalled 60 engine strike teams; 300 engines were now being responded.

As arriving resources were assigned and dispatched, the fire was divided into branches.

Engine strike teams would be increased to 165 and total 835 engines committed to the Incident.

To ensure the effective management ofresources, the Incident Commander initially divided the incident into three Branches of operation. As the incident rapidly developed, Incident operations expanded into five Branches and an Air Operations Branch under the Operations Section Chief.

BRANCH I

Branch I was assigned to the Los Angeles City Fire Department. This Branch essentially extended from the origin of the fire along the east flank of the fire down to, and including, the Skyline Villa area. Their assignment was to evacuate and protect structures in the Skyline Villa housing development.

LA City Division III Chief was the Branch Director and had seven LA City strike teams under his command. He assigned three strike teams to the Skyline Villa tract. By great fortune, this tract was largely spared massive destruction as the east flank only skirted the area and drove in a more south-westerly direction. Fire fighters from LA City and the County of Los Angeles Fire Department, utilizing a combination of camp crews, helicopters and firing-out techniques, prevented the loss of structures in this area.

The LA City Operations and Suppression Deputy Chief arrived and assumed command of this Branch. As the fire drove south he met with the County of Los Angeles Fire Department Command Staff who would eventually establish the Command Post at County of Los Angeles Fire Station 70, located on Pacific Coast Highway in the City of Malibu. Shortly afterward, four additional LA City strike teams were ordered to Coast Staging. LA City also formed their own staging area at LA City Fire Station 23.

BRANCH II

This Branch initially was established to protect the Skyline Villa area in conjunction with LA City. LA City (Branch 1) was assigned to protect everything on the east side of Old Topanga Canyon Road and County of Los Angeles resources were assigned to protect everything on the west side. A spot fire however, which ignited on the east side of Old Topanga Canyon Road, posed such a threat that it was decided to augment Branch I operations. If this spot fire had established a foot hold, not only would many homes in the Skyline Villas have been destroyed, but the fire may likely have spread further east toward Sylvia Park and then have a direct run down the canyons toward the Fernwood Pacific tract.

Branch 11 geographically began at the origin point of the fire, extending southward along the east side of Old Topanga Canyon Road all the way to Pacific Coast Highway. Division A consisted of several engines and some camp crews. They were given the task of evacuations and structure protection east of Old Topanga Canyon Road, south of Zuniga Road, to approximately Rose Lane. After the fire had moved south, this Division was combined with Division B and some of its resources were utilized to cover several stations in the area.

Division B consisted of a loose configuration of single engines from the first and second alarms. They were given the task of effecting evacuations and structure protection along the east flank and advancing front down to approximately Zuniga Road.

After the initial front of the fire moved south, fire fighters found several structures just beginning to catch fire. In one instance, a new residence at the "Kowalke Sprout Farm" had just ignited. The area around this home was covered with a thick canopy of oak trees and as the fire flashed in these aerial fuels it was transformed into an inferno. Units employed the use of a I 000 gallon per minute deck gun but the effort proved futile as the water evaporated long before it could hit its target.

After extinguishing several small fires the Division resources spent the remainder of the day mopping up around structures and cold trailing the east flank of the fire's origin.

Division B then deployed into Saddle Peak between Sadie Road and Tuna Canyon, as the fire approached.

Strike Teams were forced to "hunker down" as they watched fixed wing tankers painting lines of retardant to try and slow the fire's spread - but this was no ordinary fire. Tactics like this normally slow the fire's spread significantly, but so intense was the heat that it merely burned right through the fields of retardant.

At approximately 1400 hours, in spite of the potent winds, the fire made a rather lazy pass around this area as the fire backed down nearby canyon walls. Strike team leaders recognizing the steep canyons full of fuel, and the vulnerability of their positions, braced themselves for the fire storm that was sure to come. Within 25 minutes, as anticipated, the wind abruptly increased and the fire made an explosive charge uphill from three different directions at once. Towering walls of flame belched toward the homes and fire fighters - homes perched over the canyons lit up like matches. One strike team leader recalled how the three story house near his position shook and trembled as if it was in an earthquake. Fire fighters gamely fought involved structures as safety and water availability would allow. Many homes were saved in these areas as a result of the heroic efforts in the face of extreme danger.

As the fire passed, fire fighters scrambled to knock down fires in those homes that were salvageable. It was a frustrating experience for fire fighters to triage those that were fully involved in flames.

Many citizens waited until the fire came dangerously close before fleeing to safety. Fire fighters spent an inordinate amount of time, when time was of the essence, coaxing citizens to leave the threaten areas. Many simply didn't understand the thermal intensity with which this fire was burning.

A County of Los Angeles Fire Department Battalion Chief saw a television crew parked at the top of a canyon chimney with the fire quickly approaching. When he stopped to advise them to move, they took the opportunity to film the encounter. The Chief once again advised them of the extreme imminent danger, but the film crew continued to work. The Chief then told them he was moving to a safer area and strongly advised that they follow him. The news crew paused, thought about staying, then suddenly recognized why the Chief was leaving so hastily - the heat was building at an intense rate - they literally threw their equipment into their van and drove off as the flames licked the vehicle's exterior! Later the newscaster from this crew would apologize and commend the Chief for saving his life.

Division B would spend much of the remainder of the day mopping up the fires left behind in this neighborhood.

Division E was designated to provide structure protection from Fernwood Pacific to Pacific Coast Highway along Topanga Canyon Boulevard. As the Incident progressed, strike teams were added to prepare for the arrival of the fire.

It was an established mandate that the fire would not cross Old Topanga Canyon Road. A number of helicopters and camp crews augmented this division. Using deft fire fighting techniques, crews would allow the eastern flank of the fire to burn down toward Old Topanga Canyon Road, then fire out to sap the fire's thirst for fuel. This worked well; especially when the fire shifted with the wind in a more southwesterly direction.

Camp crews worked vigorously along this flank.When the terrain made cutting lines impossible,camp crews cut clearings around houses withtheir hand tools. In one case a bulldozer working near homes saw fire in the attached garage of ahome. Recognizing an opportunity to save thehome, the dozer operator positioned his dozerand in two passes effectively removed the flaming garage from the house, thus saving the homefrom destruction.

The directional wind shift allowed fire fighters to begin making progress along the eastern flank. Camp crews supported by progressive hose lays and working in conjunction with bulldozers and helicopters were able to truncate the fire's eastern flank. This created an odd paradox - although effectively stopping the easterly progress of the fire and thus saving Fernwood, it left large amounts of fuel between the front edge of the fire and Fernwood creating potential problems.

Integrated within the rugged canyons and hilltops that run along Old Topanga Canyon Road are homes nestled in canopies of oak. Division E was severely challenged not only by constantly changing winds, that made raging fire storms possible at any time, but by homes whose rustic surroundings made them nearly impossible to defend. Strike teams along Red Rock Road and further south on Hondo Canyon Road would see their positions overrun by fire but held losses in these areas to a minimum.

This Division was gradually reinforced during the day as more and more strike teams were brought into the Femwood area in anticipation of a possible directional change by the fire. Resources worked diligently along Old Topanga Canyon Road from Red Rock Canyon to the junction of Old Topanga Canyon Road and Topanga Canyon Boulevard. Although the primary mission was to keep the fire west of Old Topanga Canyon Road - when the fire spotted across the road near the Skyline Villas, in the early stages of the fire, the efforts of this division were divided to support the efforts of Branch 1.

Superintendent 16 arrived with his crews only five minutes after the first-in engine. Upon arrival he found a pressing dilemma: attack the flank of the fire with hand crews and possibly reduce its impact, or evacuate citizens whose homes were in the path of this fast moving fire. In choosing to aid in the evacuation effort, his crews immediately went to work assisting citizens with their belongings.

Crew superintendents then decided that the "fanning" action of this fire could-be minimized by cutting a line on the east flank, where the fire had spotted into the Skyline Villa tract.

Superintendent 17 and his crews would work the rear flank and Superintendent 16 would take his crews further south and build line to eventually tie in with Superintendent 17's line. This action prevented the fire from making uphill runs at the Skyline Villa tract where LA City stood waiting. Numerous helicopters assisted the crews by making precise low level water drops.

Further south along Old Topanga Canyon Road, strike teams were hastily evacuating citizens and preparing for the fire if it were to suddenly push down the canyon. Good luck was on their side as the winds pushed the fire in a more south-westerly direction. Even with the winds pushing the fire away from the southerly portions of the tract, it eventually crept into this area near Glen Drive. By combining effort, strike teams utilizing progressive hose lays, hand crews cutting lines and helicopters providing water drops, were able to completely extinguish the fire from the east side of Old Topanga Canyon Road by nightfall.

BRANCH III

This branch was formed to protect structures along the west flank and the south-westerly advancing front of the fire. With the fire pushing south-west it was apparent that the Monte Nido area would be in grave danger.

Branch Directors, in the early phases, would only be able to assign single resources, perhaps two or three depending upon the situation, to a Division. As the fire progressed and more resources poured into Malibu, Divisions would be assigned multiple strike teams and become consolidated.

Divisions F and G were assigned to protect the numerous houses along Stunt Road. With the fire pushing directly at them, and spotting well ahead of itself, it didn't take long for these divisions to engage in fire fighting. They were particularly concerned with the 10 to 14 foot high stands of brush that had not burned in over 30 years.

Strike teams dug in along with desperate home owners and attempted to wet down roofs, overhanging eves and ornamental shrubbery near the houses. Many of these efforts were in vain for fire brands driven by relentless winds were able to bury themselves into recesses and vents. Furthermore, the intense heat produced by the fire, pre-heated and dried all combustible materials - however some strike teams reported success by pre-treating homes with foam.

As the fire worked its destruction along Stunt Road, strike teams regrouped and positioned themselves along Schueren Road - other strike teams formed where Stunt Road turns into Saddle peak Road. Aerial tankers and helicopters were actively engaging the fire, laying down tons of water and retardant. The fire seem to be moving in multiple directions at will making it particularly wicked in nature.

Many fire fighters reported that the smoke was so heavy and full of fire brands that it seemed like night. Others watching from neighboring hilltopsreported 100to 150footflamelengths as the fire ran uphill. One engine captain recalled an incident when the flames were so intense that a nearby home literally burst into flames although the fire hadn't actually reached it yet.

Most brush fires will leave remnants of vegetation as they pass through - this fire however left the landscape devoid of all signs of life. Tree stumps were burned to the ground, and the area was left as barren as the moon.

Camp crews working in these aforementioned areas proved to be highly effective although armed only with hand tools. In some instances they would position themselves ahead of the fire and cut clearances around homes. Then, as the fire approached, and if the circumstances allowed, they would fire-out. In case after case, using chain saws, they would cut wooden decks from homes and push them down the canyons. Some were cut away as a precaution, others were on fire while being removed. In one tract, although one home was lost, quick action by these crews prevented the fire from impinging on other exposed homes, virtually saving the entire tract.

Camp crews supported by helicopters, aerial tankers and engines providing progressive hose lays, were able to successfully flank this fire and prevent its early spread west across Mullholland Highway. This was an important stop as the area west of Mullholland Highway contains numerous homes and would allow the fire to cut a larger, more destructive swath along the west flank.

Resources were assigned to structure protection in the heavily populated Monte Nido tract which lay directly in the fire's path. Fire officials began bracing themselves for what was sure to yield terrible losses.

Engine crews watched in awe as the fire worked its way down Calabasas Peak through canyons and over peaks growing larger by the second. To make matters worse the fire was spotting well ahead of itself, adding to the inevitable perception that Monte Nido was destine to tragically collide head-on with the fire.

Miracles do occur, and the fire suddenly turned sharply south as it began drawing an on shore flow.

Seizing the moment, aerial tankers and helicopters bombarded the western flank with vigor. Six bulldozers worked along the edge of the fire in an attempt to pinch the flank. Their combined efforts blunted the fire's progress and held the fire to the north-east of Monte Nido for the time being.

Later in the afternoon, the fire began turning from south to south-west. The head of the fire was much further south at this point as it was pressing toward the Malibu Civic Center near the coast. Large amounts of unburned fuel were still left between the nearly three mile long western flank and the area to the west.

Officials feared that the fire would begin sweeping west toward Malibu Beach, the Malibu Hills and the Malibu Bowl areas and then return to the north - again toward Monte Nido.

Reinforcements were added to the divisions in Monte Nido as the fire forced Division Supervi- sors to spread their resources thin.

During this time the fire ran straight at and over the Monte Viento area and Fire Suppression Camp 8. Walls of fire were driven up canyons so fast that even experienced fire fighters were surprised at the fire's ability to leap great distances in a heartbeat. Most fire fighters were lucky enough to walk away with only minor bums - one California Department of Forestry Crew was not so fortunate.

While protecting a home in the Monte Viento tract, the fire suddenly overran their position in a burst of flames. Two of the fire fighters were able to duck into the house and be spared the fire's intense heat however the engineer and captain who sought refuge inside the cab of their engine were not as fortunate. The heat shattered the windows of the engine exposing them to the fierce heat. The two fire fighters suffered serious burns even though protective fire shelters were deployed inside the cab. They were evacuated out of the area and airlifted to the Sherman Oaks Bum Center.

BRANCH IV

This branch was developed during the early afternoon as it became quite apparent that this fire would reach the coast and bifurcate east and west. This branch had boundaries of Piuma Road to its north and Rambla Pacifico on the coast. The Branch included the Serra Retreat area, the Civic Center, Pepperdine University, Hughes Research Laboratories and many businesses. In addition the Malibu Beach, Malibu Hills, Malibu Colony and Malibu Bowl residential areas were also protected by Branch IV.

Historical maps of past fires indicated that the fire would eventually make a direct run at Serra Retreat. Situated at the mouth of Malibu canyon, with plenty of exposure to dry fuels, its hillsides beckoned wild fires to engulf them. At approximately 1500 hours it did.

Division X was the first to get a taste of the battle in this Branch with the fire striking first in the Sweetwater Mesa area just east of Serra Retreat. Although a relatively small housing tract in comparison, many of the homes were exposed to the steep canyons below. Fire fighters fought their way through scores of citizens trying to evacuate the area, and arrived just as the fire made its run at the homes - fire fighters were able to hold their ground and losses were held to two homes.

The fire was now moving as predicted and drove straight at Serra Retreat. It is one thing to predict the path of a fire, it is quite another to stop it. The fire struck with a vengeance destroying a significant amount of vegetation - no homes were lost thanks to gutsy fire fighters who rode out the hell-like conditions that swept all around them. After the fire roared by they began immediate fire fighting operations on homes that were only partially involved. These quick actions prevented any homes from being lost, although one historic barn burned to the ground.

At the same time the fire impacted Serra Retreat it also struck the Carbon Mesa area. One County of Los Angeles Fire Department engine was caught in a swirling mass of flame with the crew narrowly escaping serious injury.

Massive bulldozing efforts were now taking place to blunt the fire 's ability to move into the Civic Center and Pepperdine areas. The fire would push south-west toward the Hughes Laboratories and the Civic Center during the late night hours of November second.

Division T was given the assignment of holding the fire to the east along a fire-break that had been constructed along Malibu Canyon Road. Erratic winds along this three mile long flank worried fire fighters as spot fires continuously jumped the fire-break keeping fire fighters scrambling. At one point a photographer was badly burned when he was trapped by a spot fire. Late during this initial attack period, a backfiring operation was attempted to keep the flank in check - strong gusts of wind caused the fire to jump the control line and forced this Division to retreat from its original position. As the next operational period began, the fire was bearing down on the Hughes Research Facility and Pepperdine University.

BRANCH V

Division Y was assigned to protect structures along Pacific Coast Highway from the Malibu Pier to Rambla Pacifico, and canyon properties accessible from these points. Pacific Coast Highway during the early afternoon was congested with traffic by evacuating citizens and arriving fire engines. The California Highway Patrol eventually shut down the highway to all but emergency traffic and the situation improved significantly.

At approximately 1330 hours it became apparent that the Rambla Pacifico area and Las Flores Canyons would be struck hard. The winds were blowing at 50 miles per hour and the fire had become a four mile wide monster that was devouring canyons in its path like a machine. Las Flores and Rambla Pacifico presented fire fighters with steep narrow canyon roads and thick brush. Homes built in these areas are perched on hillsides and along saddles and chimneys. Additionally, there were several small tracts of homes nestled in hollows at the bottom of canyons.

Literally hundreds of engines were within these canyons to protect structures. Despite the apocalyptic eeriness which lay before them, engine companies ascended into these canyons courageously, as safety would allow. Their experiences will no doubt impact them profoundly for the remainder of their lives.

Division Z was assigned the areas from Rambla Pacifico to Topanga Canyon Boulevard. This included all canyon areas accessible along these boundaries from Pacific Coast Highway. Adequate water now became an issue - water tanks, which are perched high atop of hills in Malibu, are fed through electrical pumps from the large water main which runs beneath Pacific Coast Highway - the demand for water was so excessive, the capacity of these tanks was quickly depleted.

With the electrical power knocked-out, there were no pumps with which to supply water to the tanks supporting the canyons. Engines needing water either had to drive down to Pacific Coast Highway, draft water from swimming pools or wait for water delivered by water tenders.

In addition to the hundreds of fire engines that were already in these canyons, hundreds more waited along Pacific Coast Highway to be assigned positions. Communications at this point were so jammed with units attempting to broadcast, and failed repeater capabilities, that the only way supervisors could ensure that their orders were being followed was to physically drive to locations and communicate face-to-face.

Many fire fighters described the fire as "boiling" at this point. Smoke was so thick that one could not see the road for more than a few feet in any direction. Fire fighters suffered respiratory problems and their eyes burned severely. The wind seemed to blow from several directions at once and flaming brands the size of softballs were being hurled about. Combustible mixtures of dust in the air actually created small bursts of fires in mid-air.

The spot fires created a labyrinth along access routes. Wooden power poles caught fire and tumbled onto the road ways. Rocks, large and small, that had been held against the hillsides by dense brush were loosened by the fire and came crashing onto the roads below. Animals of all sizes and types were running amuck. The bridge over Las Flores Creek burned and collapsed leaving only one escape route from the area - back to the north through the mouth of the fire.

As the spot fires combined at an incredible rate within Carbon Canyon, the fire seemed to surge eastward up the canyon walls of Rambla Pacifico in one monstrous monolith of flame. It completely encircled the enormous grounds of Fire Suppression Camp 8 and ignited several structures. One large pile of timber that was stored in an open area burned so completely that not even an ash remained.

Even the most seasoned of Fire Fighters gasped in awe at the incredible destructive forces thi s fire wrought. Homes literally seemed to explode into flames, cars in driveways burst into flames, propane tanks exploded - everywhere one looked there was fire. The fire seemed to attack every- thing at once without prejudice - it was omni-present, powerful, and not nearly finished.

The fire roared over Rambla Pacifico and pushed through Las Flores Canyon like a runaway freight train. Multiple fires burned within the canyons fanned by tremendous winds. A more perfect formula for a fire storm could not have been created. The Branch Director recalled, "embers as big as your fist began to blow by at an incredible rate then suddenly the sky turned extremely black and the ground began to shake - the wind which had been blowing so fiercely abruptly stopped... There was a moment of quiet except for the distant rumbling - then the wind began sucking uphill toward the fire and I saw the fire literally blow out of Las Flores Canyon like a blow torch - something I've never seen in 28 years on the job. Several experienced brush fire officials termed the fire behavior in Las Flores Canyon as a 4 4 area ignition."

The Rambla Orienta, Rambla Vista and Las Flores

Mesa areas suffered heavily with regard to losses. Flames swept down in biblical proportions, overrunning fire fighters and claiming the lives of an elderly couple trying to escape the fire's fury in their pick-up truck. Courageously, fire fighters endured searing heat and blinding smoke to save what homes they could.

One assisting agency strike team was intent to save an apartment house that had just caught fire. Utilizing a hydrant fed from the strong mains along Pacific Coast Highway, they deployed multiple lines - but the fire simply was generating too much heat energy. In spite of their heroic efforts, the apartment house burned to the ground. Fire fighters who witnessed this event were stunned.

The Incident Commander issued a safety message, through Command and Control, to ensure that company commanders would position themselves and their equipment in safe locations. At this point the Incident Commander monitored over 21 calls for help, from engines and strike teams being trapped or overrun. Commanders were forced to abandon their positions in many areas. All resources were ordered to evacuate from Las Flores Canyon as a result.

Nearly 2/3 of the homes in these two aforementioned canyons were now on fire. As strike teams were sent up to salvage homes they were styn-tied by the inaccessibility of the roads.

After the front had passed, fire fighters worked hard to extinguish flames. Handicapped by the lack of water, or fire hoses that had burned under intense flames, fire fighters struggled to perform mop-up operations. It would be days before they could ensure that all of the fires in this area were out.

The fire, now bearing down on the Command Post at Fire Station 70, gave many in the Command Staff their first view of the fire's destructive powers. The Operations Chief saw the fire envelop a canyon where several strike teams had just been dispatched to protect homes. He watched in horror as mammoth flames devoured the canyon and felt that he might have just sent fire fighters to their death. After several agonizing minutes the strike team leader radioed in that everyone was safe and that they were knocking out fires.

Although the fire's proximity hastened a re-location of the Command Post to Pepperdine University, the size of the Command Staff and the need for B ase operations dictated the move. In a six hour period more fire engines had arrived in the Malibu area than normally existed in several counties combined - more were on the way.

The fire jumped across Pacific Coast Highway in several places and literally burned to the sand.

The fire, in the height of its glory, raced toward the Big Rock Area where Division Z lay waiting. Strike teams in this division did not feel the situation was safe for fire fighters and were forced to withdraw their resources from Big Rock and then to re-position. The fire struck hard, and over fifty plus homes lay ablaze.

AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH

County of Los Angeles Fire Department helicopter crews, dispatched on the first alarm, immediately recognized the tremendous threat to life and property. The fire was being pushed by strong Santa Ana winds and already cutting a swath through extremely dry brush that had not burned in over 30 years. The fire was spotting well ahead of itself to the south and west, and had already jumped Old Topanga Road on the east and was threatening to make what could be a potentially disastrous and deadly run toward densely populated Topanga Canyon and the heavily populated Femwood area.

All available County of Los Angeles Fire Department helicopters were now assigned to combat the fire. The first two copters (Air Squad 9 and Air Ship 2) began working the Old Topanga side (east flank) of the fire. The next two copters (Air Squad 17 and Air Squad 8) began working the leading edge of the fire as it made its run south. Several Los Angeles City Fire Department helicopters worked the west side of the fire.

All pilots recognized the futility of attempting to make any sort of "knock-down" on the front of this fire. Driven by 50 mile per hour winds that were constantly changing direction and multiple points of spotting ahead of the fire, normal brush fire fighting operations had to be altered. The mission at this point was to work the flanks of the fire in an effort to prevent the fire "from getting big behind itself."

Air Squad 9, returning from Sherman Oaks Burn Center, immediately went to work in tandem with Copter 2. They began attacking the east flank of the fire with a vengeance. Although many units on the ground were calling for airdrops, low visibility, heavy radio traffic and the shear number of requests prevented pilots from fulfilling all of these demands. Pilots relied on years of experience and intuition to guide them to strategic targets. The breadth of targets was limitless; roofs and porches on fire, tree fires next to houses, fire involved homes next to those yet non-involved as well as protective drops in support of fire fighting crews. The erratic strong winds forced pilots, who prefer to make water drops from an altitude of 60 feet, to operate at altitudes as low as ten feet above ground level.

One pilot reported that it wasn't uncommon to see flames over the front of the nose of the copter. Concentrating keenly to maintain control of their helicopters, which were being buffeted by the extreme winds, pilots could rarely tell if the water drops were successful until they made a run later in the same area. One pilot zeroed in for a very close water drop on a large wooden porch thatwasjustbeginningtocatchfire. He knew that immediate action was necessary to prevent the house from surely burning to the ground. After delivering the drop he was unable to gauge it's effectiveness but upon returning later, he found the porch fire out and the house intact.

Pilots reported that they made many drops on vehicles whose drivers suddenly found themselves surrounded by this fast moving fire. As one resident recalled, who had suddenly found herself trapped and about to be overrun by a wall of flames, "It was like an angel sent from heaven - he just came out of nowhere and dropped water right next to us." Countless heroic acts such as this saved an untold number of lives.

The devious wind behavior forced pilots to become innovative in order to deliver water to their intended targets. Pilots reported that at times they would fly in under the smoke, below the fire's elevation, bank the helicopter 90 degrees and release the water all in one motion - literally slinging the water uphill toward the fires. They also reported that the use of foam (injected into the water tanks) was extremely effective. This was particularly true for pre-treating homes in advance of the impending fire. As one pilot later recalled, "one foam drop had the same effect as three or four with water alone." Water drops alone could not extinguish this wind driven brush fire this support however allowed crews to proceed along the flanks of the fire reducing the vegetative fuel load with great success. Air Squad 9 and Copter 2, working with a combination of hand crews, bulldozers, and fire engines on the eastern flank of the fire were successful in holding the fire out of Topanga Canyon neighborhoods and west of Old Topanga Canyon Road.

As Air Squad 17 returned from Sherman Oaks Bum Center he turned his attention to the leading edge of the fire in an attempt to protect homes that were threatened. By this time the fire was crossing over Saddle Peak and had gathered an enormous amount of momentum and fury. So thick was the smoke, the pilot later recalled, that he was forced many times to fly a mile or more out to sea at wave top level - this in order to gain sufficient visibility to return to the helispot at Pepperdine University.

As the fire progressed, Air Squad 17 desperately seeking water would land anywhere it could find a fire hydrant - street comers, business parks, literally anywhere the crew could safely connect to a water source.

Targets were plenty - the fire was literally leap- frogging as it threw firebrands a mile or more ahead of itself. As the numerous spot fires grew, entire areas would literally explode into a massive expanse of burning hell. The term for this phenomenon is known as "Area Ignition." Pilots reported seeing this occur several times during the course of this day. The most witnessed occurrence was yet to come .

The pilots continued their relentless asault against the fire as tragedy struck once again. More bum victims were being reported and this time it was fellow fire fighters. A California Department of Forestry engine crew had suffered major bums when they were overrun by fire. The victims were driven to County of Los Angeles Fire Department Camp 8, which by this time was surrounded by fire, and quickly transported via Air Squad 9 once again to Sherman Oaks Bum Center.

Pilots chased and attacked the fire all the way to Pacific Coast Highway. It was during this last push south that the fire vented its most anger. Despite tireless efforts, the heaviest home losses of the day would take place in the Rambla Vista, Las Flores and Big Rock tracts. As the fire contacted the coast it then bifurcated and spread along Pacific Coast Highway to both the east and west.

The fire, barely hours old had now burned its way to the Pacific Ocean.

"We didn't give up anything to this fire, what it got, it had to take from us." - Incident Commander -

By the end of the initial attack period the fire had traveled a lateral distance of six miles. As Fire Department officials had predicted the fire had blazed a trail to the coast, consuming many homes in it's path and charring over 10,000 acres. Many stories of heroics occurred during this time period and the fives of three citizens were lost. Numerous units were trapped and overrun by the fire and five fire fighting units were ultimately damaged with six fire fighters receiving bums as a result. The initial operations of this devastating incident will no doubt be recorded as one of the most gallant efforts in the history of fire fighting as well as one of the most devastating with regard to property lost. Although the fire had vented a significant portion of it's devastative energy, within these initial few hours, it still was not exhausted and the incident moved on.

Tuesday, November 2, 1993, 800 hours to November 3, 1993, 0600 hours At this point of the Incident the Operations Section had been expanded to include five geographic Branches. These Branches were supported by nine Divisions, as well as the Air Operations Branch. The fire at this point had consumed in excess of 10,000 acres and due to it's movement toward Fire Station 70 the Command Post had been relocated to Pepperdine University. The General Control Objectives during this period were: To effect structural protection in conjunction with Fire Fighter safety. To confine the fire west of Old Topanga Canyon Road.

To keep the fire out of the Femwood Pacific area.

To begin permissive evacuation of Topanga Canyon.

To confine the fire east of Cold Canyon and to direct it around Monte Nido. To tie the fire control line into Malibu Canyon Road at the tunnel location. To construct and tie in a control line from the Monte Nido area north to Mulholland Highway.

To confine the fire east of Malibu CanyonRoad and north of Pacific Coast Highway. To provide structure protection in the urban interface areas of Serra Retreat, Big Rock and Las Flores Canyon and begin overhaul and mop-up of damaged structures. 110 Strike Teams (550 engines) were now committed to the fight.

BRANCH I

Was responsible for the continued mopping up operations of all areas between the point of origin along Old Topanga Canyon Road (including the Skyline Villa area) to the intersection of Old Topanga Canyon Road and Topanga Canyon Boulevard. It was imperative that no "rekindles" spot east of Old Topanga Canyon Road.

BRANCH 11

Divisions A and E carried out this assignment. Although many flare-ups would occur during the night hours, the fire never spotted east of Old Topanga Canyon Road. Units labored through the night to keep the fire's flank from spreading east. Although their area did not see the fire storm like conditions as did many other divisions during the night, their efforts cannot be understated.

Branch 11 was also assigned to confine the fire west of Old Topanga Canyon Road and to restrict fire spread to the Femwood Pacific area as well as to effect evacuation of Topanga Canyon south to Pacific Coast Highway. Having heard of the destruction wrought earlier by this fire, the Branch Director knew that this would be no easy task. He suggested back-firing operations at Tuna Canyon Road to eliminate fuel. This was turned down as the winds were too erratic and air support would not be available. It was decided that fire fighters would hold this flank until morning when back-firing operations could be supported by Air Operations.

Division B, deployed along Tuna Canyon Road, Topanga Canyon Boulevard and in Femwood Pacific, watched and waited as bulldozers and hand crews labored to construct lines along the east flank.

The east flank of the fire began to spread east during the early evening hours between the hours of 2200 and 0100. The winds increased moving on-shore and easterly along the coast, this pushed the fire along the three mile front. The fire was stopped along the boundary of Femwood Pacific during this operational period and hundreds of homes were now held in a precarious balance.

The scene at night was one of wonderment and respect. Swirling winds sent brightly lit embers aloft and made the sky seemingly filled with millions of fire flies. Smoldering bushes, fanned by winds, glowed with an eerie quality. Now, the visual enormity of this fire was more recognizable. The fire's glow on distant hilltops and canyons on the horizon stretched for miles. Pushed up canyons by strong winds, the flames seemed to jump the length of football fields at a time - then roll back to the oncoming head of the fire in a sweeping wave-like motion.

BRANCH III

The primary objectives assigned this Branch were to confine the fire east of Cold Canyon and to direct it's path around Monte Nido as well as to tie the fire control line into Malibu Canyon Road at a location around the tunnel and to tie in a control line north from Monte Nido to Mulholland highway utilizing direct tactics.

Divisions F and G had been combined to promulgate this operation. At the beginning of this operational period the fire looked as if it might overrun the controlline. Thefirehadjustmadeits most significant effort west since early in the fire. Shifting winds had suddenly given it new life on this flank. The fire umped Mullholland High way north of Monte Nido - fire fighters were hell bent on preventing an extension into Monte Nido.

Bulldozers, air tankers, camp crews supported by helicopters, and strike teams utilizing aggressive firing-out techniques created new control lines. As good fortune would have it the winds which had been pushing west suddenly ebbed. Fire fighters, their efforts now at rabid heights, were able to successfully control this flank.

BRANCH IV

Division T deployed resources around the Hughes Research Facility currently being threatened. Combining efforts with Hughes's own fire department at the facility, fire fighters were able to prevent a single loss.

With the timely decrease in winds a firing operation was ordered to establish a more defensible control line. Firing-out operations are always risky as they are at the mercy of the wind. After lengthy consultations, the firing plan was established and promulgated. Soon after the operations began the winds began blowing gusts westward - it didn't take long for the fire to spot behind the control lines, and once again the fire was raging out of control in a mile long edge.

It would take fire fighters well into the night to once again establish a control line nearly two miles further west. It should be noted that no homes were lost as a result of the firing operations.

Divisions X deployed resources, protecting the University grounds throughout the night, and by working diligently were able to prevent a single structural loss.

BRANCH V

Divisions Y was now mopping-up in Serra Retreat after a very successful operation. Mop-up operations were also taking place in Sweetwater Canyon and Sweetwater Mesa. Many strike teams from this division were now gamely engaging the fire around the businesses near the Malibu Civic Center.

On the coast, Fire Department boats along with Los An2eles County Life Guards were positioned to assist people who might be trapped in their ocean front homes. In addition, the Coast Guard had positioned the cutter "Conifer" off the coast with the capability of holding 500 people.

Although the fire did manage to catch fire in a lagoon area across Pacific Coast Highway, no property losses occurred as fire fighters were able to quickly extinguish incipient fires before they could cause damage.

As this operational period began this Branch faced a tall order - confine the fire north of Pacific Coast Highway as well as structure protection in the Las Flores Canyon and Big Rock areas. At this point Big Rock was in the middle of a fire storm and multiple homes were on fire. The eastern head of the fire was moving rapidly along the hills and canyons above Pacific Coast Highway. If it continued at this rate it would surely jump first Tuna Canyon and then Topanga Canyon.

Division Z was augmented with strike teams as the fire blew into Big Rock. There were 50 plus homes ablaze. Running shuttles of water, engines attacked structure fires when they felt there was the possibility for a save. The winds were blowing hard and personnel reported that embers were spotting everywhere. In spite of frustrations, fire fighters saved a remarkable number of homes during this time.

During the night the fire seemed to ebb and flow as it pushed east. Winds would die down then as if turned on by a bumer, rage ahead. Final I y, the winds calmed down around 0100 hours and the fire would only creep throughout the remainder of the night. It was decided to take advantage of the diminished conditions and initiate firing operations, along Tuna Canyon Road, at the first break of daylight.

As day light first broke across the Malibu area, Branch V in conjunction with Branch II began back firing operations to hold Tuna Canyon Road. This would take them into the next operational period.

The fire struck hard in the Las Flores Heights area during this time. Water shortages hampered efforts to stop the fire from claiming more structures.

After 0100 hours fire fighters would finally get a break-the winds substantially diminished. Fire fighters took advantage of this lull to aggressively overhaul and mop-up in the Las Flores Heights area; thus, preventing further damage. Engines would apply their precious water to burning structures then quickly drive down to areas where they could refill.

AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH

As darkness set in and the winds continued. Four helicopters remained in operation until 21 00 hours with a fifth helicopter joining the night battle at 1800 hours. These five County of Los Angeles Fire Department air ships operated until after 0100 hours on the morning of the third. Fearing pilot fatigue and the associated safety concerns, it was decided by the senior pilot that air operations would be halted until daylight to provide the weary pilots with well deserved rest.

By the end of this night fire fighters had faced tremendous challenges. Steep inaccessible terrain made it difficult to control the fire in the wild land. Narrow winding roads with singular access and egress points made it not only difficult but extremely dangerous for units committing to structure protection.

Radio communications were bad at best due to the steep narrow canyons in which units operated. Water systems were found to be inadequate for the provision of water needed for fire fighting operations. The smoke hampered visibility and the weather had definitely chosen to align and side with the fire. As a result of the fire crossing Malibu Canyon Road the fire burned back firing operations to hold Tuna Canyon Road. This would take them into the next operational period.

The fire struck hard in the Las Flores Heights area during this time. Water shortages hampered efforts to stop the fire from claiming more structures.

After 0100 hours fire fighters would finally get abreak-the winds substantially diminished. Fire fighters took advantage of this lull to aggressively overhaul and mop-up in the Las Flores Heights area; thus, preventing further damage. Engines would apply their precious water to burning structures then quickly drive down to areas where they could refill.

AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH

As darkness set in and the winds continued. Four helicopters remained in operation until 2100 hours with a fifth helicopter joining the night battle at 1800 hours. These five County of Los Angeles Fire Department air ships operated until after 0100 hours on the morning of the third. Fearing pilot fatigue and the associated safety concerns, it was decided by the senior pilot that air operations would be halted until daylight to provide the weary pilots with well deserved rest. By the end of this night fire fighters had faced tremendous challenges. Steep inaccessible terrain made it difficult to control the fire in the wild land. Narrow winding roads with singular access and egress points made it not only difficult but extremely dangerous for units committing to structure protection.

Radio communications were bad at best due to the steep narrow canyons in which units operated. Water systems were found to be inadequate for the provision of water needed for fire fighting operations. The smoke hampered visibility and the weather had definitely chosen to align and side with the fire. As a result of the fire crossing Malibu Canyon Road the fire burned completely around Pepperdine University. Fire fighters defended all structures on the University grounds and the Command Post without loss. By the end of the First Operational Period the fire had charred over 12,000 acres and many homes had been destroyed throughout the night.

Wednesday, November 3, 1993, 0600 hours to 1800 hours

The morning of November 3rd found fire fighters exhausted yet somehow eager to continue the battle. The Operations Section had consolidated the operation to include four Branches, an Air Operations Branch and 16 Divisions. The General Control Objectives were;

To provide structure protection, overhaul and mop-up procedures within the urban interface, and to maintain patrol operations.

To provide foroersonnel safety, identifying escape routes and posting lookouts. To keep the fire within all established control lines.

To maintain good communications.

BRANCH I

Branch I and Branch V began this operational period by initiating a firing-out operation along Tuna Canyon road. This was highly successful along much of the control line. Unfortunately, the winds along the lower end of the fire caused spotting near the Rodeo Grounds area and once again threaten structures. This fire pushed right down to the coast and threaten not only many businesses, but also to cross Topanga Canyon Boulevard. With several helicopters dropping water in close support, fire fighters were able to stop the fire from crossing Topanga Boulevard.

Division A was assigned to contain the fire west of Old Topanga Canyon Road. Division B was to complete mop-up and overhaul.

Division C was charged with keeping the fire west of Topanga Canyon from Femwood Pacific to Pacific Coast Highway. In conjunction with camp crews, heavy lift helicopters and L.A. City units, they held the fire west of Topanga Canyon Boulevard.

The strength of the Santa Ana Conditions had diminished and natural on-shore breezes began blowing. Unfortunately, this meant that the fire would began traveling north to unburned sections of brush along the west side of Topanga Canyon Boulevard. Fire fighters would chase the fire up the rugged hills of Topanga Canyon Boulevard all morning long.

Division D assisted Division C to keep the fire west of Topanga Canyon and west of the Femwood Pacific Tract.

Division E was also to assist in confining the fire west of Old Topanga Canyon Road.

BRANCH II

Division F was assigned to confine the fire east of the dozer line from Mulholland Highway to Monte Nido.

Division G was to keep the fire east of the dozer line from Monte Nido to Piuma and east of Malibu Canyon.

BRANCH III

Division H was charged with keeping the fire east of Corral Canyon. Division I was assigned to confine the fire north of Pacific Coast Highway. Division J was assigned to keep the fire east of Puerco Canyon and to construct a control line from Malibu Canyon to Pacific Coast Highway.

Division K was assigned to mop-up and overhaul.

Division L was also assigned to mop-up and overhaul as well to confining the fire north of Pacific Coast Highway.

BRANCH IV

Divisions W, X and Y were assigned to overhaul and mop-up and to keep the fire north of Pacific Coast Highway.

Division Z was assigned to structure protection and to keep the fire west of Topanga Canyon and north of Pacific Coast Highway.

AIR OPERATIONS BRANCH

At 0600 hours Air Operations once again resumed. Although not completely diminished, the winds had subsided somewhat however the fire demonstrated that it still had some fight left. As the winds began to pick up with the advent of the day, the fire once again began spreading east and west, jumping fire control lines on both sides.
Pilots now had smaller areas in which to concentrate their efforts and more resources with which to do it. By now the large Vertol and Sky Crane helicopters had joined in the fight. Using the large copters to strike areas closer to the ocean and at targets not requiring precision, the smaller copters of both the County of Los Angeles and Los Angeles City Fire Departments worked in unison to prevent the fire from crossing Topanga Highway.

On the west side of the fire California Department of Forestry helicopters, Vertol helicopters, Sky Crane helicopters and Air Tankers attacked relentlessly. Their efforts proved successful as the West flank of the fire was slowed to a creep by 1000 hours. On the east side of the fire along Topanga Canyon Boulevard, Air Operations were operating at a feverish pitch. Slowly but surely the air crews were preventing the fire from crossing this all but too important point of demarcation. If the fire would have been successful in crossing this control line, it would have certainly made an uphill run into Pacific Palisades. Crews were now feeling confident that they may have this monster under control - but fires have a way of humbling even the most wily of fire fighters.

At approximately 1500 hours the fire spotted in several places east of Topanga Canyon Boulevard. An all out effort was mustered to snuff it out - 1 0 to 1 1 helicopters diligently worked the area. As if they were magically being spit out of the sky, the helicopters lined-up for drop after drop. After hours of arduous work the threat was mitigated.

Helicopters would continue their drops for many days to come; however, during the first 32 hours of the fire, County of Los Angeles Fire Department helicopters alone made over 750 drops.

Wednesday, November 3, 1993, 1800 hours to Thursday, November 4, 1993, 0600 hours

By the evening hours of November 3rd the strong Santa Ana winds had subsided and fire fighters were making significant gains in controlling the fire. Branch V was re-established and the control objectives for this, the Third Operational Period were:

To confine the fire west of Topanga Canyon.
To confine the fire east of Corral Canyon.

To confine the fire north of Pacific Coast Highway.

To confine the fire south of Mulholland and Old Topanga Canyon Road.

BRANCH I

Division A was assigned to keep the fire west of Old Topanga Canyon Road and to provide structure protection as needed as well as aggressive mop-up of their area. Division B was instructed to maintain the current fire control lines and provide structure protection and aggressive mop-up.

Division C was to keep the fire west of Topanga Canyon and to patrol for and extinguish spot fires.

Division D was assigned to keep the fire west of Topanga Canyon, provide structure protection if necessary, to patrol for and extinguish spot fires and to perform aggressive mop-up of their area.

Division E was to keep the fire west of Topanga Canyon, patrol for and extinguish spot fires and to perform aggressive mop-up of their area.

BRANCH II

Divisions F was assigned to keep the fire east of Cold Creek, to patrol for and extinguish hot spots, and to perform aggressive overhaul.

Division G was assigned to mop-up the Mulholland area and around all structures in their area.

BRANCH III

Division H was assigned to confine the fire east of Corral Canyon and to protect structures in Corral Canyon. They were also assigned to perform aggressive mop-up and to extinguish spot fires.

Division I was assigned to confine the fire north of Pacific Coast Highway, protect structures along Pacific Coast Highway, to extinguish hot spots and to perform aggressive mop-up. Division J was assigned to protect structures in Puerco Canyon, to extinguish hot spots and to perform aggressive mop-up.

BRANCH IV

Divisions W and X were assigned to keep the fire north of Pacific Coast Highway, to protect structures, to extinguish spot fires and to perform aggressive mop-up. Division Y was to confine the fire north of Pacific Coast Highway and west of Topanga Canyon, as well as to extinguish spot fires and perform aggressive mop-up. Division Z was assigned to protect structures in Latigo Canyon, to confine the fire east of Latigo Canyon and to extinguish spot fires.

BRANCH V

Division K was assigned to protect structures in Solstice Canyon, to confine the fire east of Solstice Canyon and to extinguish spot fires.

Division L was to keep the fire east of Latigo Canyon, to protect structures in Latigo Canyon and to extinguish spot fires.

Division M was assigned to confine the fire north of Pacific Coast Highway between Corral Canyon and Latigo Canyon, to protect structures and to extinguish spot fires. During the Third Operational Period many fire fighting foot holds had been gained, however many tasks were yet to be completed.

Thursday, November 4, 1993, 1600 hours to Thursday, November 4, 1993, 1800 hours The Operations Section during this period was anticipating 100% containment by 1800 hours. The General Control Objectives to effect this goal were:
To confine the fire west of Topanga Canyon.

To confine the fire east of Corral Canyon.

To confine the fire north of Pacific Coast highway.

To confine the fire south of Mulholland and Old Topanga Canyon Road.

BRANCH I

Division D was assigned to the south end of the Femwood Tract where hand crews were to construct a fire control line and to Division Z was made up of LA City strike teams and they had staged themselves along Pacific Coast Highway, Topanga Canyon Boulevard and to the east along the boundaries of LA City to remove vegetation from around the residences. Engines were to mop-up and protect structures.

Division E was to improve the fire control line at Topanga Canyon Boulevard from the slop over south to Pacific Coast Highway, with engine strike teams mopping-up. Division S was a contingency Division and they were to evaluate and plan for the fire if it crossed Topanga Canyon Boulevard. All resources within this Division were to stage at Coast Staging available on a three minute status.

Division T was assigned to the north end of the Fernwood Tract where hand crews were to remove vegetation around residences with engines mopping-up around structures. All additional resources assigned to Branch I were to report to staging.

BRANCH II

Division B was designated at this point in the incident to be an Interior Structure Group. The Group was assigned to mop-up and patrol and be prepared to respond to calls within the fire perimeter. They were also instructed to stay mobile and visible to the public. Division F was assigned to construct hand lines and effect mop-up. The lines were to be constructed north from the Division G/F break and south from the Division N/F break.

Division G hand crews were to construct a fire line along the fire perimeter from the Malibu Canyon Road tunnel north and east to Monte Nido with engines staying prepared to hold the road if necessary.

BRANCH III

Divisions H, K, L and M were contingency Divisions charged with developing contingency plans for the fires edges from; 1.) Pacific Coast Highway to Latigo Canyon Road, 2.) Latigo Canyon Road from Pacific Coast Highway to Malibu Vista 3.) Solstice Canyon Road from Pacific Coast Highway to the east for approximately two miles and 4.) Corral Canyon Road from Pacific Coast Highway to Malibu Bowl east to the fire's edge.
Division J was to construct a fire control line as needed between Pacific Coast Highway and Malibu Canyon Road mopping-up as necessary.

BRANCH IV

Divisions W, X and Y were assigned to patrol, mop-up and stay mobile.

BRANCH V

Division A was assigned to aggressively mop-up and patrol in and around structures. Division C was assigned to protect structures, pre plan and make public contact.
Thursday, November 4, 1993, 1800 hours to November 5, 1993, 0600 hours From the Fifth Operational Period until the conclusion of the Incident all units on the fire were to continue interior mop-up and active patrolling. Fire control lines were improved and 100% containmentwas declaredonnovember I 1, 1993. The maximization of assistance to the public was an assignment known to all, and performed in a manner to have contributed to the title of "Fire Fighter" becoming a term of endearment for the citizens of Malibu California.


PLANNING SECTION


The Planning Section for the Old Topanga Incident was responsible for the collection, evaluation, dissemination, and use of all available information, about the development of the incident, as well as the status of pertinent available resources. This information was needed to: Understand the current situation.

Predict the probable course of incident events.

Prepare alternative strategies, and control operations for the Incident. The Planning Section was further divided into the following functional units with the accompanying responsibilities:


RESOURCE UNIT

Established all check-in activities.

Prepared and processed resource status change information. Prepared and maintained displays, charts, and lists which reflected the current status and location of suppression resources, transportation, and support vehicles. Maintained a master check-in list of the resources assigned to the Incident. The facility initially utilized by the ResourceUnitwas County of Los Angeles Fire Station 70. This also was the location of the initial Command Post. This proved to be valuable for identification of the initial attack resources assigned to the Incident including their Branch anddivision assignments. The Resource Unit was later relocated to the Plans Trailer stationed at Pepperdine University. Planning functions continued to operate out of the Plans Trailer for the duration of the incident. Check-in functions were set up at the stagingareasandatPepperdineBase. Throughout the Incident the Resource Unit was responsible for the tracking of 165 engine strike teams, 25 single resource engines and Emergency Support Teams EST'S, 129 hand crews, 31 air tankers, 23 helicopters, 13 dozers, 50 water tenders, I I fuel tenders, 8 food dispensers and over 7000 fire fightersand support personnel.

SITUATION UNIT

Collected and organized incident status and situation information. Evaluated, analyzed, and displayed this information for use by lCS personnel, agency dispatchers, and the Operations Coordination Center.

The Situation Unit was also initially located at County of Los Angeles Fire Station 70 and later relocated to theL.A. County Haz-Mat Trailer situated at Pepperdine University. As the unit personnel received and processed information it was displayed on status boards for Plans Team personnel consideration.


DOCUMENTATION UNIT

Maintainedaccurate andcomplete incidentfiles.

Provided duplication services for incident personnel.

Packed and stored incident files for legal, analytical, and historical purposes. The documentation of the Incident was accomplished by maintaining hard copies of all Incident Action Plans, ICS 214 forms, situation maps and any other written documentation.

Duplication services were provided by using the on site duplication machine provided at Pepperdine University. The use of standard forms, that are recognized state wide, proved to eliminate potential confusion among assisting agencies.

DEMOBILIZATION UNIT

Prepared the demobilization plan

Assisted Incident Sections and Units to ensure orderly, safe and cost effective movementofpersonneland equipment from the Incident

All strike teams and individual resources were demobilized through the Staging Area at the Civic Center Base. It was felt that by tracking all resources through a central demobilization l